A camera can pass every technical test in the quotation and still be unusable. Not because the image is soft or the housing leaks, but because of a rule the quotation never mentioned: the model cannot be authorised for sale, the end user’s tender excludes its manufacturer, or the buyer’s own security policy will not accept it.
Those are three separate layers with three separate documents, and suppliers merge them into one sentence - “we have CE and FCC” - which answers none of them. This is how to separate the layers before money moves, and what can be checked without a laboratory.

Three layers, three documents
| Market | Layer | What it covers | In force | Evidence the buyer needs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US | Radio and EMC approval | FCC equipment authorisation: Part 15B for wired models, Part 15C for models with radio | In force | FCC ID in the grantee database, applicant matching the factory |
| US | Procurement ban | NDAA FY2019 Section 889 - Part A (13 Aug 2019) and Part B (13 Aug 2020), implemented in FAR 52.204-25 | In force | Signed covered-equipment representation naming the manufacturer |
| US | Equipment authorisation ban | FCC Report and Order FCC 22-84 (25 Nov 2022); no authorisation of Covered List equipment after 6 Feb 2023 | In force | Attestation per application; manufacturer attribution |
| EU | Radio and EMC approval | CE marking under RED 2014/53/EU | In force | DoC plus test report from a recognised laboratory |
| EU | Cybersecurity for radio equipment | Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/30, harmonised standards EN 18031-1/-2/-3 | 1 Aug 2025 | Test report against EN 18031-1 for internet-connected radio equipment |
| EU | Horizontal product cybersecurity | Cyber Resilience Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 | Reporting from 11 Sep 2026; main obligations from 11 Dec 2027 | Security-by-design documentation, vulnerability handling process |
| UK | Consumer product security | PSTI Act 2022 and the 2023 security requirements regulations | 29 Apr 2024 | Statement of compliance: no universal default password, vulnerability disclosure contact, minimum update period |
| China | Domestic security standard | GB 35114-2017, mandatory for public security video networking, levels A/B/C | 1 Nov 2018 | Device certificate and GB 35114 level when the end user is a Chinese public security network |
The point of the table is that a “CE certificate” and a “compliance statement” are not interchangeable, and neither of them is the answer to “can my buyer install this”. Read the tender first, then ask for the specific layer it names.
The attribution question: who actually made it
NDAA Section 889 names five manufacturers - Huawei, ZTE, Hytera, Hikvision and Dahua - and the prohibition extends to their subsidiaries and affiliates. The FCC Covered List carries the same names, and since February 2023 equipment from those entities cannot obtain a new equipment authorisation in the US at all, under either the certification or the supplier’s declaration route.
The sentence that matters in every quotation is this: private label does not change manufacturer attribution. Renaming the housing and the box does not change who built the imaging pipeline.
This is not theoretical. In February 2025 the FCC moved to revoke authorisations for two camera models whose applicant had attested the equipment was not covered equipment, after the Bureaus tentatively concluded the equipment was produced by an entity on the Covered List. The applications carried signed attestations, and the Commission’s own rules allow streamlined revocation where an attestation turns out to be false. A supplier’s paper trail is only worth what the SoC inside the camera is worth.
Five questions expose the chain quickly:
- Who designed the SoC and the imaging pipeline, and where?
- Who writes and signs the firmware - the factory, or a third party?
- If the camera talks to a cloud or P2P service, who operates it and where does the video go?
- Is the factory an ODM for a brand that appears on the Covered List, even if your order carries no logo?
- Can the factory put the attribution statement on its own letterhead, with the model list attached?
A supplier who cannot answer 1 and 2 has not answered the compliance question, however many certificates are attached.
The product security layer: what a camera now has to prove
This layer is newer, and it is the one most Chinese factories are least ready for, because it is not about the product passing a test in a chamber - it is about how the product behaves on a network.
The UK pulled the first requirement forward. Since 29 April 2024 the PSTI regime requires three things of connectable products sold to UK consumers: no universal default or easily guessable passwords, a published point of contact for reporting vulnerabilities, and a stated minimum period during which security updates will be provided.
The EU took a different route and attached cybersecurity to the radio approval. From 1 August 2025, internet-connected radio equipment must meet the requirements activated by Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/30, with EN 18031-1 as the harmonised standard for network protection. A Wi-Fi or 4G camera sold into the EU now needs that test report in the same file as the EMC report. A purely wired PoE camera sits outside that specific delegated act - which is exactly why the horizontal Cyber Resilience Act matters, because it does not care whether the product has a radio.
The CRA timeline is already running: reporting obligations for actively exploited vulnerabilities started on 11 September 2026, and the main requirements apply from 11 December 2027. For a hotel or a factory buying cameras today, that reads as a tender clause appearing in 2027 documents, and as a reason to ask now whether the supplier has a vulnerability process at all.

If the cameras are one line inside a larger building package, the evidence has to line up with the rest of it - the same handover logic that governs ELV system design and delivery, where every subsystem is signed off with documents rather than promises.
Firmware and remote access: eight items that can go into a contract
| Item | What the factory usually says | What to ask for | How to test on arrival |
|---|---|---|---|
| Default credentials | “Password can be changed” | Per-device unique password, or forced setup on first boot | Try the documented default on a fresh unit |
| Open services | “Standard ports” | Full service list; telnet, FTP and UPnP off by default | Port scan the unit on a flat network |
| Cloud and P2P | “Free app, easy remote view” | Written data-flow statement; local-only mode | Watch outbound traffic with P2P disabled |
| Firmware integrity | “Latest firmware” | Version, build date and SHA-256 hash per batch | Compare hash with the release note |
| Update period | “We support forever” | Minimum update period in writing, as under the UK rules | Check the update page is publicly reachable |
| Vulnerability handling | “No vulnerabilities” | Published contact, CVE response time, disclosure policy | Send a test report and time the reply |
| SBOM | Rarely offered | Software bill of materials for the main components | Ask for one model, not the whole range |
| ONVIF and VMS behaviour | “ONVIF compatible” | Which profiles, and whether authentication is enforced | Open an RTSP stream with no credentials |
Two rows deserve emphasis. A camera that reaches a P2P relay by default is not merely a privacy question: in tenders it is now a network-security question, and the answer “it can be disabled in the app” is not the same as “it is disabled by default”. And a firmware hash costs the factory nothing, yet it is the only way to prove that the unit in the box is the unit that was tested.
Ten lines to add to the RFQ
- Model, SoC and firmware owner, with the manufacturer’s full legal name.
- Covered-equipment statement signed by that legal entity, listing subsidiaries used in production.
- Radio approval: FCC ID or CE DoC, with the report number matched to the model.
- EN 18031-1 report if the model has Wi-Fi, Bluetooth or cellular.
- Default credential policy and first-boot behaviour.
- Service list and ports, with what is disabled out of the box.
- Data-flow statement covering any cloud or P2P function.
- Minimum security update period and the vulnerability reporting contact.
- Firmware version and hash per production batch, in the packing list.
- Whether the same hardware is supplied as an ODM to other brands - and under which names.
Most factories answer 3 and 5 without difficulty. Items 2, 4, 7 and 10 are where the conversation becomes honest, because they cannot be answered by a certificate already in the drawer.
What to check when the goods land
Compliance failures are cheap to find on arrival and expensive to find in a tender. Five checks, none of which needs a laboratory:
- Port scan the camera on an isolated switch: how many services answer, and are any of them telnet, FTP or an unauthenticated web endpoint.
- Default credentials: on a fresh unit, try the documented default before the factory’s engineer touches it.
- Firmware hash: read the version and hash from the web interface and compare with the release note and the sample.
- Update path: confirm the firmware download page and the vulnerability contact are publicly reachable, not “available on request”.
- Stream authentication: attempt RTSP and ONVIF access with no credentials, and with a viewer that ignores authentication.
Write the results into the handover file. If the project ever lands in a tender dispute, that page is worth more than any statement of compliance.
Six things that go wrong
- Treating “CE + FCC” as one compliance box. Radio approval, procurement bans and cybersecurity are asked for by different people in the buyer’s organisation.
- Accepting a statement in the brand’s name. The statement has to come from the entity producing the equipment, and it has to survive a check of the SoC.
- Assuming a Chinese-language market is exempt. If the end user is a Chinese public security network, GB 35114 and its A/B/C levels decide what the specification can even say.
- Ignoring the CRA because it is 2027. The reporting obligation started in September 2026, and European consultants are already writing it into specifications.
- Leaving P2P on because the app is convenient. A default cloud relay is the single most common finding in camera network reviews.
- Getting the firmware hash after the shipment. It only proves something if the packing list carries it and the sample is kept.
Where this fits with the rest of the buy
Compliance is a filter, not a specification. The screening logic for choosing the factory - supplier types, six checks, cost structure at 1,000 units - is in CCTV camera sourcing from China, and the numbers that decide resolution and lens belong to DORI and pixel density. Certification verification across product categories, including how to spot a borrowed FCC ID, is covered in the product certification guide.
What this page adds is the layer that sits between a good supplier and a camera your buyer is allowed to install - and the small set of documents and tests that decide it.
Send the model, the target market and the tender clause your buyer is quoting, and we will tell you which of the three layers applies and which document is missing. We answer within 48 hours, in writing, with the factory’s own statements attached rather than paraphrased. Send the model and the target market or use the RFQ template to put the ten lines above into a form a Chinese factory will actually fill in.